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Recent Cases
CRIMINAL LAW-FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE-MAILING OF PUNCHBOARD NOT
VIOLATION OF LOTTERY PROVISION
United States v. Halsetkl'
Perry Halseth was indicted for depositing a letter, a circular and a punchboard
in the mails in violation of Section 213 of the Criminal Code of 1909.2 The letter
indicated how the addressee might obtain a radio free by selling chances on the
punchboard, and how purchasers of lucky numbers would receive a radio and ball-
point pens. The merchandise could be obtained by sending the full amount in
cash, or by C.O.D., or could be "purchased" by the addressee. The district court
sustained the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, on the ground that the
indictment did not state an offense because the mailing did not concern an existing
lottery or scheme to obtain prizes by lot of chance. The United States appealed
and the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding (1) that the
statutory words "concerning any lottery" meant "concerning any existing, going
lottery"; that the mere mailing of paraphenalia for or information about a lottery
did not violate the statute.
A lottery has been defined as a scheme for the distribution of prizes by lot
or chance among persons who have paid or agreed to pay a valuable consideration
for the chance to obtain a prize.3 The essential elements of a lottery scheme are
three: prize, consideration and chance. The prize may be anything of value
4
offered as an inducement to participate in the scheme, and is usually of much
higher value than the consideration paid.5 The consideration may be the doing of
1. 72 Sup. Ct. 275, 96 L. Ed. 173 (1952).
2. 35 STAT. 1129-1130, 18 U. S. C. § 336, the pertinent parts of which are:
"No letter, package postal card, or circular concerning any lottery, . . . or similar
scheme offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance; and no
lottery ticket or part thereof, or paper certificate, or instrument purporting to be
or to represent a ticket, chance, share or interest in or dependent upon the event
of a lottery, . . . or similar scheme offering prizes dependent in whole or in part
upon lot or chance; ... and no newspaper, circular, pamphlet or publication of any
kind offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or containing
any list of the prizes drawn or awarded by means of any such lottery.., or scheme,
whether said list contains any part or all of such prizes, shall be deposited in or
carried by the mails of the United States.... Who ever shall knowingly deposit...
anything to be ... delivered by mail in violation of . . . this section . . . shall be
filed or imprisoned. . . ." This statute was revised in form by the 1948 Criminal
Code, 62 STAT. 762, 18 U. S. C. A. 1302.
3. Peck v. United States, 61 F. 2d 973 (5th Cir. 1932); 38 C. J. 287.
4. United States v. Purvis, 19.5 Fed. 618 (N.D. Ga. 1912) (loans at low
rate of interest); Glass v. United States, 222 Fed. 773 (7th Cir. 1915) (house, lots).
5. See United States v. Rich, 90 F. Supp. 624, 627 (E.D. Ill. 1950); and
compare United States v. 83 Cases of Merchandise Labeled "Honest John," 29 F.
Supp. 912, 914 (D. C. Md. 1939).
(357)
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something or giving up of some right, and it need not directly benefit the one offer-
ing the prize.6
The element of chance is often the determining factor of whether a particular
enterprize is a lottery.1 A definition of chance as an element of a lottery is an
'fattempt to attain certain ends, not by skill or any known or fixed rules, but by
the happening of a subsequent event, incapable of ascertainment or accomplish-
ment by means of human foresight or ingenuity."s How much chance is required to
make an otherwise lawful scheme into a lottery is a question on which courts differ.
When the results of a scheme are determined by lot-i.e. a drawing-as in a pure
"policy" or "numbers" racket, chance is the sole determining factor, and probably
no court would deny the fact. A scheme may be a lottery when chance is not the
sole determining factor of the outcome; and the better view seems to be that even
though skill, judgment or research may be helpful, nevertheless if chance is the
dominant causative factor in determining the results of the scheme, it may be a
lottery.9 Thus a guessing game as to the total popular vote to be cast for the
President of the United States, °0 an essay contest wherein no objective standard
was established to select the "best" essay,". and a cartoon contest' 2 were lotteries.
When the word "chance" is used with the word "lot," as in the statute in the
case noted, a court may be prone to construe the meaning of "chance" to be con-
trolled by the meaning of "lot." The apparent effect of such judicial interpretation
is to restrict the application of the statute to situations in which chance is the
sole factor in determining the outcome of the scheme. Thus in Uilited States v.
Rick." defendant, who was engaged in bookmaking, betting on horse races and
baseball games, was held not to be engaged in a lottery under 18 U. S. C. A. 1302.14
The federal district court said that the chance involved in defendant's activities
did not resemble the chance involved in the distribution of prizes by lot,15 but
was more like the chance involved in the success of a business enterprize. However,
in the older cases, the rule had been stated to the effect that if it is impossible
under the circumstances to ascertain information upon which a correct choice alone
could be made, then chance in the lottery sense existed.16
The statute involved in the case noted has been before the lower federal
6. Brooklyn-Daily Eagle v. Voorhies, 181 Fed. 579 (E.D. N.Y. 1910)
(sending of labels was sufficient consideration).
7. E.g., State v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 341 Mo. 862, 110 S.W.
2d 705 (1937).
8. 17 R. C. L. 1223.
9. State v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 341 Mo. 826, 110 S.W. 2d 705
(1937); 38 C. J. § 5, p. 291.
10. Waite v. President Publishing Assn., 155 Fed. 58 (6th Cir. 1907).
11. Brooklyn-Daily Eagle v. Voorhies, 181 Fed. 579 (E.D. N. Y. 1910).
12. State v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., supra n. 9.
13. 90 F. Supp. 624 (E.D. Ill. 1950).
14. See note 2 supra.
15. But see United States v. Jefferson, 134 Fed. 299, 300 (W.D. Ky. 1905)
(that congress did not intend any particular method to give effect to lot or chance).
16. Waite v. President Publishing Assn., 155 Fed. 58, 60 (6th Cir. 1907).
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courts many times,1" and was derived from United States Revised Statutes Section
3894 as amended,' s which likewise has been before the federal courts often.19 The
statute was early declared penal and to be strictly construed. 20 The district courts
found the intention of congress in the enactment of Section 3894 to be the sup-
pression of the "evil influence" and "pernicious results" of lotteries by preventing
lottery dealers from advertising or promoting their schemes by mail.2' The word
"(concerning" in the phrase, "letter or circular concerning a lottery," had been inter-
preted not in its broadest sense of "pertaining to or related to," but in a more
restricted sense so that a father writing his son of the evils of a lottery would
not be subject to prosecutions. 22
Whether an averment of the existence of a lottery in an indictment was es-
sential was first considered in United States v. Bailey.23 The court stated that
there should be an averment of the existence of a lottery or of an intention to hold
a lottery. However, lack of sufficient facts prevents use of the case as an authority
under the statute in question.
17. United States v. Rich, 90 F. Supp. 624 (E.D. Ill. 19$0); Boasberg v.
United States, 60 F. 2d 185 (5th Cir. 1932), cert. denied 287 U. S. 644 (1932);
Peck v. United States, 61 F. 2d 973 (5th Cir. 1932); Post Publishing Co. v. Murray,
230 Fed. 773 (1st Cir. 1916); Eastman v. Armstrong-Byrd Music Co., 212 Fed.
662 (8th Cir. 1914); United States v. Purvis, 195 Fed. 618 (N.D. Ga. 1912);
Brooklyn-Daily Eagle v. Voorhies, 181 Fed. 579 (E.D. N. Y. 1910).
18. REv. STAT. § 3894, as amended 26 STAT. 465 (1890): "No letter, postal
card, or circular concerning any lottery, so-called gift concert, or other similar enter-
prize offering prizes dependent upon lot or chance, or concerning schemes devised
for the purpose of obtaining money under false pretenses, and no list of the draw-
ings at any lottery or similar scheme, and no lottery ticket, or part thereof, and
no check, draft, bill, money, postal note, or money order for the purchase of any
ticket, tickets or part thereof, or of any share or any chance in any such lottery
or gift enterprize, shall be carried in the mail or delivered at or through any post-
office or branch thereof, or by any letter carrier, nor shall any newspaper, circular,
pamphlet, or publication of any kind offering prizes dependent upon lot or chance,
or containing any list of prizes awarded at the drawings of any such lottery or
gift enterprize, whether said list is of any part or of all of the drawing be carried
in the mail or delivered by any postmaster or letter-carrier. Any person who shall
knowingly deposit . . . [in the mail] in violation of this section . . . shall be
punished...."
19. Homer v. United States, 147 U. S. 449 (1893); Commerford v. Thompson,
1 Fed. 417 (C.C. Ky. 1880); United States v. Noelke, 1 Fed. 426 (D. N. Y. 1880);
United States v. Mason, 22 Fed. 707 (E.D. Va. 1884); United States v. Clark, 22
Fed. 708 (E.D. Va. 1885); United States v. Zeister, 30 Fed. 499 (N.D. Ill. 1887);
United States v. McDonald, 59 Fed. 563 (N.D. Ill. 1893); United States v. Politzer,
59 Fed. 273 (N.D. Calif. 1893); United States v. Wallis, 58 Fed. 942 (S.D.
Idaho 1893); United States v. Fulkerson, 74 Fed. 619 (D. Calif. 1896); United
States v. Sauer, 88 Fed. 249 (W.D. Mich. 1898); Glass v. United States, 222 Fed.
773 (9th Cir. 1915).
20. Commerford v. Thompson, 1 Fed. 417 (C.C. Ky. 1880).
21. Commerford v. Thompson, supra n. 20; United States v. Mason, 22 Fed.
207 (E.D. Va. 1884); United States v. McDonald, 59 Fed. 563 (N.D. Ill. 1893);
United States v. Sauer, 88 Fed. 249 (W.D. Mich. 1898). See United States v.
Zeisler, 30 Fed. 499, 501 (N.D. Ill. 1887).
22. See United States v. Noelke, 1 Fed. 426, 432 (D. N. Y. 1880).
23. 47 Fed. 117 (S.D. N. Y. 1891).
1952]
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In Boasberg v. United States24 appellant deposited in the mail one week before
the opening night a circular stating that the game of Keno would be inaugurated
on February 5, 1930 in New Orleans at the Suburban Gardens with $100 or more
to the winner. Appellant was indicted under the same statute as in the case noted
for depositing in the mails a circular concerning a lottery, and the indictment was
upheld. Under the interpretation of the statute laid down by the Supreme Court in
the principal case, the indictment would have been quashed because no "existing,
going lottery" was involved.
The Supreme Court relied upon the cases of France v. United States25 and
Francis v. United States26 as authority for limiting the application of the statute
in question to existing lotteries. The statute involved in those cases was Section 237
of the Criminal Code of 1909.27 A reading of the two statutes indicates that neither
the purpose nor the effect of each statute is or was intended to be the same. The
court seemed to have been influenced by the fact that congress had not included
punchboards in its recent legislation concerning slot machines.2 s Never before had
congress enacted legislation concerning interstate transportation of slot machines,
but legislation prohibiting the promotion and advertisement of lotteries by mail
has a long history.29 Schemes whereby merchandise is distributed by punchboard
have been held to be lotteries for sometime.80
It is submitted that full effect can not be given to the intention of congress
or to the purpose of the statute under the restricted interpretation placed upon it
in the principal case.
ROBERT P. KELLY
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATIoN-TAXABILITy OF CONTEST PRIZES
U. S. v. Robertson'
Plaintiff wrote a symphony during the years 1937-1939 and it remained
unpublished for several years thereafter. In 1945 a philanthropist offered three
24. 60 F. 2d 185 (Sth Cir. 1932).
25. 164 U. S. 676 (1897).
26. 188 U. S. 37$ (1902).
27. 35 STAT. 1136, 18 U. S. C. 337: "Whoever brings into the United States
for the purpose of disposing of the same, or knowingly deposits with any express
company or other common carrier for carriage, or carries in interestate or foreign
commerce any paper, certificate or instrument purporting to be or to represent a
ticket, chance, share, or interest in or dependent upon the event of a lottery, gift
enterprize, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon
lot or chance, or any advertisement of or list of the prizes drawn or awarded by
means of, any such lottery, gift enterprize, or similar scheme; or knowingly takes or
receives any such paper, certificate, instrument, advertisement, or list so brought,
deposited or transported, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both."
28. Act of Jan. 2, 1951, P. L. 906, 15 U. S. C. A. 1171.
29. See note 21 supra.
30. E.g. Helen Ardelle, M. C. v. Fed. Trade Comm., 101 F. 2d 718 (9th
Cir. 1939).
1. 190 F. 2d 680 (10th Cir. 1951) certiorari granted 342 U. S. 896 (1951).
[Vol. 17
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awards for symphonic compositions, announcing as his purpose the furtherance of
understanding among the Pan-American nations. The Detroit Orchestra, Inc., of
which he was president, was to get certain exclusive rights to the winning composi-
tions. Plaintiff, upon hearing of the awards, submitted his symphony and von the
first prize of $25,000. He paid an income tax thereon and later filed for a refund.
The district court concluded that the prize was a gift.2 On appeal, reversed.
Section 22 (a) I. R. C. broadly defines gross income as ". . . gains, profits, and
income derived from ...compensation for personal service . . . of whatever kind
and in whatever form paid." Section 22(b) (3) I. R. C. excludes from gross income
"Gifts . . .The value of property acquired by gift. . . ." In construing these
sections, there is no longer any policy of resolving doubts in favor of the taxpayer3 ;
furthermore, in view of the general purpose to tax all income, specific exemptions
are strictly construed. 4
One of the concepts of taxation law which appears somewhat unusual at first
glance is that which holds that income may result from money received for service
rendered though there is no obligation owed to the recipient 5 One example of this
is money paid to an employer for some past service which he has rendered."
Another is the simple tip given to hat-check girls and waiters.7 It seems, therefore,
that though the presence of consideration will prevent a gift,8 the absence thereof
will not necessarily create one under the income tax statute. The tax can be
avoided only if the money or property received is not given as compensation for
some service rendered.9
If entering a contest such as that described in the principal case constitutes
an acceptance of a contractual offer, the prize would seem to be clearly taxable.
This facet should not be overlooked since such contests have sometimes been held
to create legally enforceable rights.10 However, it will be assumed in this discussion
that the contestant could not reasonably construe the contest rules as an offer to
contract thereby presenting the question: When is a voluntary prize or award given
to a contestant taxable?
The Commissioner has held that the following are examples of taxable income:
Prizes received in a picture identification contest sponsored by a newspaper";
2. 93 F. Supp. 660 (D.C. Utah 1950).
3. White v. United States, 306 U. S. 281 (1938); cf. Gould v. Gould, 245
U. S. 151 (1917).
4. Comm. v. Jacobson, 336 U. S. 28 (1949); Helvering v. American Dental
Assoc., 318 U. S. 322 (1943).
5. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm., 279 U. S. 716 (1928).
6. Fisher v. Comm., 59 F. 2d 192 (2d Cir. 1932), where the corporation
treated the payment as a business expense; Nickelsburg v. Comm., 154 F. 2d 70
(2d Cir. 1946), whore the corporation did not treat the payment as a business
expense.
7. Roberts v. Comm., 176 F. 2d 221, 10 A. L. R. 2d 186 (9th Cir. 1949).
8. Noel v. Parrott, 15 F. 2d 669 (9th Cir. 1926).
9. But see the unusual case of Edwards v. Cuba R. R., 268 U. S. 628 (1925).
10. Anno. 67 A. L. R. 419 (1930).
11. L T. 1651, 1I-1 CuM. BULL. 54 (1923).
19521 REGENT GASES
5
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1952
362 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17
prizes received in a contest sponsored by a restaurant (tickets given with meals)12;
prizes received on a radio quiz show where contestant answered a question". These
examples all have one thing in common aside from the fact that some "service"
was rendered; the award was a part of an advertising scheme negativing any com-
pletely donative intent and allowing a finding that participation was a "service"
to the "donor" for which the award was compensation. However, the fact that
the contest is an advertising scheme alone seems insufficient since the Tax Court
has held that when a winner does nothing but accept the money, the prize is a gift,
no service having been rendered.14
The Commissioner, in a recent I. T., has clearly indicated that the "service"
rendered is much more important than the intent involved. I. T. 405616 holds
fellowships taxable when the recipient applies his skill to research or creative work.
However, when the element of competition is not present and the "donee" does
not anticipate any benefits from his work (example: Nobel prize), the award is
not taxable. 0
McDermott v. Commissioner" was one of the first cases to deal with the
particular problem involved in the principal decision. The McDermott case held
that a prize won by a law professor in an essay contest sponsored by the American
Bar Association was a gift on the grounds of policy, intent of the donor and a lack
of anticipation of "payment" on the part of the recipient. The Commissioner re-
fused to accept the decision and promulgated I. T. 396018 which stated that awards
given which required services directly in connection therewith were taxable.
Several decisions have disapproved the McDermott case because of the stress
which the court put on the intent of the donor.19 This criticism may be justified in
view of the statement in Helvering v. American Dental Association to the effect
that: "The fact that the motives ... were those of business or even selfish . . . is
not significant. The forgiveness [of a debt] was gratuitous, a release of something...
for noting . . ." (italics mine).20 If the converse of this statement is true, then
the Supreme Court apparently supports the Commissioner's view that nothing must
be done in the way of services regardless of the motive (or intent) of the "donor".
However, thus far, the decisions commenting on the McDermott case, with the
possible exception of the principal case, have distinguished it. The ground for the
distinction seems to have been the commercial flavor which the later cases have
12. 1. T. 1667, I-1 CUM BULL. 83 (1923).
13. I. T. 3987, 1950-1 CuM BULL. 9.
14. Pauline C. Washburn, 5 T. C. 1333 (1945), where all winner did was
answer phone-no questions, appearances or participation.
15. 1951 ITr.-REv. BULL. 17.
16. VIII-1 CUM. BULL. (1929).
17. 80 U. S. App. D. C. 176, 150 F. 2d 585 (1945).
18. 1949-2 CUM. BULL. 13.
19. Van Dusen v. Comm., 166 F. 2d 647 (9th Cir. 1948); Stein v. Comm.,
14 T. C. 494 (1950) (involving brewery's contest for postwar plans for peace);
Frederick v. Waugh, P-H 1950 TC MEM. DEC. 50,095; Strauss v. Strauss, P-H
1947 TC Mms. DEC. ff 47,202.
20. Helvering v. Amer. Dental Co., supra note 4, at page 331.
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had which was not present in the McDermott decision. The only case supporting
the McDermott case also involves such factors and is clearly in conflict with the
others decided since then.21
Aside from the fact that the Robertson case stressed the point that the tax-
payer entered the contest with the expectation of receiving payment for his efforts,
the McDermott decision can be distinguished from the principal case in two possible
ways: (1) The Commissioner's course of action since McDermott v. Commissioner
in the examples of fellowship and contest awards where services are rendered has
been clarified and consolidated; this administrative past action was given weight
in the McDermott case and has been accorded weight in others.22 (2) The "donor"
in the principal case received a benefit in procuring the composition for the
orchestra of which he was president and the award could more easily be construed
as compensation therefor.
At any rate, the analysis of the Robertson case seems to involve taxing nearly
all gifts on condition precedent if the performance of the condition could possibly
be construed as "service." The concept of "income" has been broadened by the
courts and the Commissioner to include many things which, as the McDermott
case pointed out, would not be considered income by anyone not talking law. The
principal case, unless reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States which
has granted certiorari, fits well into the new concept.
WILLIAM W. SHINN
ToRTS-INJURY TO WIFE-HUSBAND'S ACTIoN-HUMANITARIAN NEGLIGENCE
Rea v. Feeback'
"Since the wife could not recover from the defendant because of her contribu-
tory negligence, the husband is also barred from recovery in his action for loss of
services and medical expenses incurred as the result of the injury." This rule has
been, and continues, to be followed in nearly all jurisdictions, despite the attacks
and criticisms it has been subjected to by legal writers and attorneys for the hus-
band. 2 And this has been true even though most courts agree that an injury to
the wife, by a negligent defendant, gives rise to two separate causes of action, one
for injury to the wife and the other in favor of the husband.3 However,'a recent
21. Amirikian v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 263 (D. C. Md. 1951).
22. Warner Bros. v. Westover, 70 F. Supp. III (D.C. Cal. 1947).
1. 244 S.W. 2d 1017 (Mo. 1952).
2. Gregory, The Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff's Wife or Child in an
Action for Loss of Services, 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 173 (1935); Gregory, Vicarious Respon-
sibility and Contributory Negligence, 41 YALE L. J. 831 (1932); Gilmore, Imputed
Negligence, 1 WIs L. REV. 193 (1921); Notes, 21 MIcH L. REV. 592-1299 (1944);
80 U. PA. L. REV. 1123 (1932); PROSSER, TORTS § 55, pp. 421-422 (1941). Also see
argument by Plaintiff's attorney in Emma Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., 206
N.W. 198, 42 A.L.R. 712 (Wis. 1925); RESTATEMENT TORTS § 494 (1934).
3. Hopkins v. Mobile & 0. R.R., 33 S.W. 2d 1009 (Mo. App. 1931); Thomp-
son v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 135 Mo. 215, 36 S.W. 625 (1896); Womach v. City of
St. Joseph, 201 Mo. 467, 100 S.W. 433, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 140 (1907); Selleck v.
City of Janesville, 104 WIs 570, 80 N.W. 944, 47 L.R.A. 697, 72 Am. St. Rep. 892
1952]
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Missouri decision, the case under discussion, has disclosed a method whereby the
contributory negligence of the wife cannot be set up as a defense to the husband's
action. The answer lies within the scope of the humanitarian doctrine, where
contributory negligence is considered a foreign issue.
In this case the wife had sustained injuries in an intersectional automobile-
truck collision, and the husband was seeking $15,570 consequential damages, basing
his right to recover and the defendant's liability on humanitarian negligence. The
plaintiff (husband) was contending that the defendant "saw or should have seen
the wife in a position of peril ... unable to extricate herself . . . and that the de-
fendant could have slackened the speed of the truck or swerved it and thereby
have avoided the collision and the resulting injuries to the wife."
The trial court, at the request of the defendant, give an instruction to the
effect that if the wife could not recover against the defendant for her injuries then
the verdict should be for the defendant.4 The jury returned a yerdict for the de-
fendant, but upon plaintiff's motion, the lower court granted a new trial upon the
ground that it erred in giving this instruction The defendant appealed to the Mis-
souri Supreme Court, the question in issue being whether or not the trial court
had abused its discretion in granting the new trial due to the instruction.
In the process of arriving at a conclusion supporting the action of the lower
court, the supreme court discussed the instruction and the rules applicable to such
actions. The court admitted that a plaintiff-husband could not recover conse-
quential damages resulting to him arising out of an injury to the wife unless the
defendant had committed a tort which would also give the wife a right of action
against the defendant, and that the plaintiff had the burden of establishing the
defendant's negligence.5 The court noted that such an injury to the wife gave rise
to two causes of action and that even though they both arose out of the same
transaction, the husband's action was a separate cause of action and an entirety unto
itself. Then in examining the instruction in question, the court said it failed to
"cdearly and explicitly" set forth or explain these principles to the jury.0 The court
felt that the instruction would inform the jury that the husband must stand in his
wife's position in the action he brings for loss of services and medical expenses
in a case submitted under the humanitarian theory even as he does in a primary
negligence case, the latter type being the usual stituation and in which the con-
tributory negligence of plaintiff's wife bars a recovery by him. The court in no
(1899); Laskowski v. People's Ice Co., 203 Mich. 186, 168 N.W. 940, 2 A.L.R. $86
(1918); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 693, Comment D. (1934). Cf. King v. Viscoloid Co.,
219 Mass. 420, 106 N.E. 988, Ann. Cas. 1916D (1914).
4. "The Court instructs the jury that the plaintiff's right to recover herein
on Count One is dependent upon the right of the wife to recover for her injuries so,
therefore, if you find and believe from the evidence that the plaintiff's wife could not
recover against the defendant herein for her injuries then you are instructed that
your verdict shall be for the defendant herein."
5. Stoll v. First Nat'l. Bank of Independence, 234 Mo. App. 364, 132 S.W. 2d
676 (1939); Thibeault v. Poole, 283 Mass. 480, 186 N.E. 632 (1933); Rossman v.
Newbon, 112 N.J.L. 261, 170 At. 230 (1934); 41 C.J.S. § 401, p. 895.
6. Supra. note 4.
(Vol. 17
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uncertain terms says that since the cause was properly and appropriately sub-
mitted on the humanitarian theory, contributory negligence had no place in the
case.7 The instruction was termed "confusing" because of its abstract generality.
When the humanitarian doctrine is examined, one can readily see why con-
tributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in the usual case, or the wife in
the principal case, has no application.8 This is because that in cases based on this
theory, the plaintiff, as well as the defendant, must have been negligent. Thus in
an action by the wife, submitted on humanitarian negligence, her contributory
negligence would not bar her from recovering from a negligent defendant, and a
fortiori it should not stand in the way of an action by her husband when he brings
an action for loss of services and medical expenses incurred as the result of the de-
fendant's negligence. In view of the fact that even in a case submitted on primary
negligence alone there is no logical reason why the contributory negligence of the
wife should bar the husband in his action, there is certainly good reason for not
allowing contributory negligence of the wife to cloud up the scene in a case based
on the humanitarian doctrine.9
Departing briefly from the principal case, and examining the so-called reasons
the courts have advanced to bar the husband-plaintiff in the ordinary negligence
actions, it is interesting to note that the courts do not agree in their explanations of
such a result. Thus the reason is assigned that "the cause of action is a derivative
one, analagous to an assigned contract"; or, "there is only one cause of action, in
two parties"; or, "since the husband has relied upon the wife's ability to exercise
her own faculties, he must take the consequences of impliedly asserting that she
is capable of going abroad alone."'1 Other courts have implied in these reasons
that they fear there would be a double recovery against a negligent defendant in
some situations. Probably the real reason lying in the background behind these
judicail assertions, is that the action for loss of services is itself a historical exception
to the rule that one person cannot maintain an action for injury to another, and
hence is limited to cases where the other is free from fault. 1 However, there would
not seem to be much support for this explanation when the effect is to deny re-
7. Haverkost v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 193 S.W. 2d 357 (Mo. App. 1946);
Bootee v. Kansas City Pub. Ser. Co., 183 S.W. 2d 892 (Mo. 1944); Doherty v. St.
Louis Butter Co., 339 Mo. 996, 98 S.W. 2d 742 (1939); Dilallo v. Lynch, 340 Mo.
82, 101 S.W. 2d 7 (1936); Borgstede v. Waldbauer, 337 Mo. 1205, 85 S.W. 2d 373
(1935); Carney v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 323 Mo. 470, 23 S.W. 2d 993 (1929);
Causey v. Wittig, 321 Mo. 3q58, 11 S.W. 2d 11 (1928).
8. McCleary, The Bases of the Humanitarian Doctrine Reexamined, 5 Mo. L.
REv. 56 (1940); McCleary, The Defense of Sole Caure in The Missouri Negligence
Cases, 10 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1945); Spann, Sole Cause Negligence Instructions, 13 Mo.
B. J. 19 (1942).
9. Supra, note 2.
10. Emma Callies v. Reliance Laundry, 206 N.W. 198 (Wis. 1925); Honey v.
Chicago B. &. P, R.R., 59 Fed. 423 (S.D. Iowa 1893); Benton v. Chicago, R. I. &
P. R.R., 55 Iowa 496, 8 N.W. 330, 3 Am. Neg. Cas. 349 (1881); Benefant v. Chap-
delaine, 131 Me. 45, 1,58 At. 857 (1932). For an interesting classification of cases
on this subject see 42 A.L.R. 717.
11. 2 HARPER, READING IN ToRTS 858 (1941).
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covery to a plaintiff for damage to his legally protected interests because another
person has been careless. 2 -
Returning to the principal case, it is submitted that the Missouri court
reached a proper conclusion, and even though the ancient rule that the wife's
negligence will bar her husband in an action for consequential damages caused by
the defendant remains the law, the humanitarian doctrine and the concepts under-
lying it do provide the plaintiff-husband a legal route to recovery when he can
submit his case on humanitarian negligence.
WILLIAM HOWARD BILLINGS
12. In discussing Section 494 (supra, note 2) in Tentative Draft No. 10
(1933), the Council said: "The principle stated in this Section is supported by the
greatly preponderating weight of authority. The view here expressed has, however,
been subject to a criticism which has much merit. There seems little or no reason
to deny recovery to the plaintiff merely because someone in whose services the
plaintiff has a legally protected interest is himself careless. The right of such person
to be free from injury and the right of the plaintiff to his services are distinct and
different. None the less the decisions are so overwhelmingly in favor of the view
stated in this section that even if a change in the law is desirable, the task of
changing it must be left to the legislature since it is not the function of the Institute
to change the law but to state it."
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